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ABSTRACT

Like many before, this thesis uses the tragedy of the Holocaust as a historical comparison
to an event occurring today, mainly in the Xinjiang region of the People’s Republic of China.
Many historians have argued that comparisons to the Holocaust should be academically or
intellectually prohibited. Many have stated that such an effort could minimize the perceived
severity of or unintentionally raise other events to the level of the Jewish genocide. However, such
comparisons should be permitted and are necessary to help prevent a similar atrocity from ever
occurring again. There is much to be learned from Nazi policy and ideology that may be used to
aid genocide prevention. Thus, this paper will discuss how policies or actions within two cases
may be similar or different via comparative analysis. Such a discussion will be approached by
examining basic principles of Nazi ideology and directly comparing them to the ideology of the
Chinese Communist Party. The secondary portion of this research will evaluate a direct
comparison of the policies of Nazi Germany and the People’s Republic of China regarding the
respective minorities in question. Furthermore, this piece's preliminary assumption is that the two
cases will be vastly different. Like many complex cases throughout history, few show literal
parallels- especially those birthing from different cultures and spanning separate eras. This thesis
fundamentally tackles the uncertainty of dissimilarity between the two cases aforementioned.
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INTRODUCTION - WHAT CRISIS?

First, they came for the socialists, and I did not speak out— because I was not a socialist.
Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak out— because I was not a trade
unionist. Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out— because I was not a Jew.
Then they came for me— and there was no one left to speak for me.1 (Niemöller, 2020, p.
738)
What do we mean when we repeat the phrase never again? Do we genuinely mean it, or do
we just want to believe a horror like the Holocaust could never happen again? Indeed, there were
those during the reign of the Nazi Party in Germany before the implementation of the Final
Solution that thought such an atrocity could never occur in a modern Germany. This sounds very
similar to the words of many today who believe that another genocide on the scale of the Holocaust
is not possible.
Today, the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, China, has fallen under the
international community's microscope, or satellite telescope. Uyghurs are the largest Turkic ethnic
group in the Xinjiang region (Davis, 2008). Multiple nations and entire international organizations
have expressed their concern regarding the secretive nature of the treatment of Uyghur Muslims
in the western region of China. The accusations lobbed at the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are
severe. The situation has created a sense of urgency among many to investigate, uphold the
meaning of never again and determine if such implications brought about by these words are
appropriate.

1

A post-war quote from Pastor Martin Niemöller (1892-1984)- a prominent Lutheran pastor and critic of
Hitler in Germany. He was forcibly imprisoned in concentration camps during the last seven years of
Nazi Party rule.
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In 2018 reports began emerging from the Xinjiang region that groups of people, solely
based on their ethnicity and religion, were being detained en-mass in political re-education camps
(Raza, 2019). With the presentation of such reports, many in the international community began
asking harsher questions. In 2019, new reports came about, increasing the suspicions of human
rights activists and governments worldwide. In these new documents, an estimated 1.5 million or
17% of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang was detained. In response to questioning, the Chinese
government attempted to reassure skeptics that the camps were established for the safety of China
by re-educating those with extremist views. Yet, more questions were left unanswered, such as why
children aged 3-6 were being forced into programs that enforced re-education (Raza, 2019).
Certain beneficial modernization programs have destroyed mosques and caused damage to
several in the span of two years from 2016 to 2018 (Raza, 2019). Another example is the HanChinese Migration Incentives. In this migration program, Han-Chinese are encouraged to visit the
Xinjiang region, where they reportedly have relatives living. During these visits, Uyghurs are
presented with eastern Chinese customs, culture, and language. It is reportedly the intention of
these programs to transform the Uyghur population into a more Chinese population. According to
Raza (2019), Uyghurs are highly encouraged, if not disallowed, to push back against these indirect
forms of cultural reeducation if they do not wish to be subject to more rigorous methods of reeducation.
There is cause for investigation into potential human rights abuses with so many unknowns.
This study will take advantage of what can be compared to Nazi ideology and policy
implementations of said ideology while determining the need for future research. In the current
case of the Uyghurs of Xinjiang, this paper will attempt to draw preliminary conclusions regarding
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the state of events and their dissimilarity to the Holocaust. Albeit, on their faces, the two cases
seemingly follow the trends of other historical comparative analyses that use the Holocaust as the
dependent variable. Due to the cultural differences and the period that separates many cases, the
Holocaust stands out as is rather unique. Hopefully, by making similar inquiries, we are fulfilling
the meaning of never again and partially clarifying some of the uncertainty surrounding this case.
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LITERATURE REVIEW - PERSPECTIVES ON COMPARATIVE GENOCIDE

There are various perspectives regarding comparisons to Nazi policies and the Holocaust.
The best phraseology for the question of comparability is instead to discuss the uniqueness of Nazi
policy and the Holocaust. Yet, the first issue we run into is the definition of uniqueness itself. Two
meanings, among others, determine that the said unique thing in question is incomparable or
unprecedented (Margalit & Motzkin, 1996). With that being said, is the Holocaust incomparable
or unprecedented- for its time or now?
According to Margalit and Motzkin (1996), when labeling a historical event incomparable,
one might logically assume that, when applied to an event such as the Holocaust, this event cannot
be compared to either past or future events. Yet, Steven T. Katz (2001) has stated in “The
Uniqueness of the Holocaust: The Historical Dimension,” chapter four of Is the Holocaust Unique?
that he firmly believes that the Holocaust is a unique phenomenon in history; never has a state set
out to destroy an entire ethnic population. In conjunction, Margalit and Motzkin (1996) firmly
demonstrated that they believe that certain aspects of the Holocaust are unique yet object to the
notion that the genocide is incomparable or unprecedented. This thesis agrees with the statements
above on perhaps a more logical level. Yes, the Holocaust itself is unique; currently, no event lives
up to the method and other factors of the genocide and policies of the Nazis. This does not mean
that the event itself should not be used as a benchmark for historical comparisons and comparisons
to the events of today or tomorrow.
Furthermore, Margalit and Motzkin (1996) agree that, because the Holocaust is
unprecedented, “new brutalities in the future may relegate the Holocaust to being merely the first
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instance of a new form of social behavior” (p. 66). Such a statement would suggest that, although
the genocide and subsequent Nazi policies are unique, they can still be used as a benchmark for
future analysis of separate events. Yehuda Bauer, a prominent historian of the Holocaust, argues
that the Holocaust is not unique. He often rivals the mystification of the genocide with the question:
if that event is not at all unique, where then are its parallels or precedents? (Eckardt & Eckardt,
1980, p. 167). This thesis will attempt to fill a gap in the literature on how Nazi policies may be
used comparatively or as benchmarks for the current Uyghur Muslim crisis in Xinjiang, China.

Comparative Case Examples

Experience and perspective can be drawn from past comparative case analyses involving
other instances in which researchers use the Holocaust as the dependent variable to examine the
independent variables of other cases in which governments or groups of individuals are accused
of genocide or ill-treatment of another group. Such comparative studies can be used by examining
the methodology, breadth of investigation, dissemination of information, and conclusions to
determine the applicability and appropriateness of using the Holocaust as the dependent variable
in this study.
René Lemarchand’s 2002 article, Disconnecting the Threads: Rwanda and the Holocaust
Reconsidered, makes a concerted effort to analyze points of convergence and dissimilarity
between the two cases of genocide in Nazi Germany and Rwanda in 1994. This piece evaluates
old and makes new points while concluding the parallels, or lack thereof, between the two.
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Lemarchand evaluates the applicability of the term genocide in each case while determining how
the individual variables of the Rwanda case align directly, or not, with the variables of Nazi
Germany. Specifically, the author grapples with the questions of defining victim and antagonist
between both cases and the degree to which they are dissimilar in each case. Lemarchand also
analyses the ideological context in which both cases unfold before discussing the differences
between the implementation of violence. Fundamentally, while re-examining the work of others
and current evidence, the paper draws many clear distinctions and similarities relatively
straightforwardly, thus providing evidence of the possibility, appropriateness, and effectiveness of
using the Holocaust as the dependent variable in comparative case analyses.
Laurence Thomas’ 1991 article, American Slavery and the Holocaust: Their Ideologies
Compared, literally tackles an ideology-biased comparative case analysis. It states boldly that the
Holocaust and American slavery are fundamentally different from one another (Thomas, 1991).
Breaking down the analysis into categories: The Coercive Factor; The Issue of Natal Alienation;
and The Conception of the Victims, this paper makes confident statements as to why the Holocaust
was genocide while American Slavery was natal alienation by using historical evidence and
previous analysis. Slightly different from the last paragraph’s article, Thomas’ article solely
discusses the ideological differences and does so efficiently, effectively, and definitively.
In Paradigms of Genocide: The Holocaust, the Armenian Genocide, and Contemporary
Mass Destructions, a 1996 article by Robert Melson, a comparative analysis of the Holocaust and
the Armenian genocide is used to determine that, although people often turn to the Holocaust as a
reference point of genocide, perhaps the proper dependent variable in such studies should be the
Armenian Genocide. The author begins by briefly stating the similarities between the two cases
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and detailing the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust individually, elaborating on the
differences in a substantially longer section afterward. As with other studies, the differences
between the two are rather extensive, while the similarities are consistently shorter or more
general- referring to patterns or the implementation of genocide. This piece also references cases
of atrocities in Nigeria and Yugoslavia, using Armenia as the dependent variable. Thus, based on
the findings of the latter analysis, it was determined that the Armenian Genocide might serve as a
better dependent variable than the Holocaust. Regardless of this secondary conclusion, this study
cements the possibility of effectively using the Holocaust to gain a better understanding of other
cases of atrocity to discover patterns, parallels, and dissimilarities while going even further to show
that the Holocaust can be used in comparison case analyses to determine which is the better
standard to compare other cases to.
It is clearly possible to effectively, efficiently, and definitively produce evidence of
parallels, patterns, and dissimilarities between comparative case analyses that use the Holocaust
to draw its dependent variables. As such, this paper confidently moves forward in its pursuit of
determining such relationships between the Holocaust and the Uyghur Muslim Crisis.

7

METHODOLOGY

The research method utilized in this study may be defined as a comparative case study. The
analysis portion tests the dissimilarity of the Holocaust and the Uyghur Muslim Crisis in the
People’s Republic of China. A traditional comparative case study utilizes the facts of two cases
and cross compares them in various ways deemed necessary and proper by the researchers. Such
a method of analysis is useful in identifying parallels, dissimilarities, and patterns between multiple
cases. Using Nazi ideology and policy implementations regarding the Jews of Germany as the
dependent variables, the ideology and policy implementations of said policy on the part of the
Chinese Communist Party regarding Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang will be directly compared as the
independent variables. The extent to which some of the major components that define each case’s
variables are dissimilar will be analyzed by making conclusions regarding how the independent
variables must develop to logically parallel the dependent variables.
This study will be modeled closely after Juliet Kaarbo and Ryan Beasley’s publication, A
Practical Guide to Comparative Case Study Method in Political Psychology (1999). According to
Kaarbo and Beasley (1999), the complications that are conjunctive with comparative case studies
usually include the problem of “too many variables” (p. 378). Becoming increasingly focused on
a specific phenomenon and addressing a finite issue is the best solution (Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999).
For the reasons above, the thesis will be focused solely on two individual cases with clear
parameters. First, regarding the Jews preceding the end of the Holocaust, this thesis will focus only
on those who resided in Germany at any point during the formation of the Nazi Party and through
the end of World War Two. To keep this comparative study organized and precise, Jews and other
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minorities outside of Germany will not be included, as the paper will be directly comparing the
ideology and policies of one government (Nazi Germany) to another government the (CCP) in the
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Together, these two parties will be analyzed regarding their
relation to the specific minority populations within their borders within their respective periods
and cross-compared. Given the parameters of limitation surrounding this Honors Undergraduate
Thesis, it would be unwise to delve any further into other academic study while promising to
address the issue in question appropriately.
It is hypothesized that the treatment of Uyghur Muslims on the part of the People’s
Republic of China is dissimilar to the treatment of the Jews preceding the end of the Holocaust on
the part of Nazi Germany regarding policy and, more so, ideology. To make this study easier to
replicate, the hypothesis being tested can be described, according to the classification requirements
laid out by Elezovic (2021), as a theoretical, qualitative hypothesis (pp. 166-167). In the case of
this thesis, this classification means that the hypothesis being used is formed in a manner that aids
the explanation of the research itself by using a theoretical qualitative extreme to be tested.
Two extremes may act as the hypothesis and aid the research and explanation of findings:
one, the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in China is entirely dissimilar to the treatment of the Jews
in Germany; two, the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in China is altogether similar to the treatment
of the Jews in Germany. According to the scientific method of study, it is logically plausible that
either extreme may be concluded as accurate; both must remain an open possibility to produce a
logical study. Although, based on superficial research, it is clear that the final answer will fall
somewhere between the two extremes. As René Lemarchand (2002) stated, history, “as someone
said, never repeats itself, but it sometimes rhymes” (p. 499). As such, due to the cultural and period
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differences between the two cases, it can be theorized that the cases will have striking
dissimilarities, but patterns may emerge. The former hypothetical explanation will be used for the
creation of the hypothesis because it seems, in this case, it will be simpler to provide data to
disprove the existence of nothing rather than disproving the existence of everything: the treatment
of Uyghur Muslims in China is entirely similar to the treatment of the Jews in Germany.
In comparative case studies, it is imperative to “establish the relationship between two or
more variables; it is necessary to minimize variability in other variables that may affect the
investigated relationship” (Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999, p. 379). The variables that will be tested are
as follows: the extent to which the case of the Uyghurs in China resembles the case of the Jews in
Nazi Germany in terms of ideology and policy. The thesis will qualitatively test the hypothesis of
whether these variables concerning Uyghurs in China compare to those of the Jews in Germany
during the reign of the Nazis. These variables will be tested in a manner consistent with the
methodology (Step 3 and 4) laid out by Kaarbo and Beasley (1999) in that the historical variable
(Jews in Nazi Germany) will be used to derive the bases of comparison in a broad manner (p. 380).
This is because the history of the Holocaust and Nazi policy is well established, while the situation
Uyghur Muslims are experiencing is unfolding. Therefore, a question that will be used to test the
similarities or differences between the two cases will be: If we know fact A about the Uyghur
situation, how must it progress to be the same as fact A regarding the Jews in Nazi Germany, if
there is even a similar fact in both cases. Furthermore, how easily can fact A regarding the Uyghur
situation progress to exemplify fact A regarding the Jews in Nazi Germany? If there is no
equivalent or similar fact A in both cases or is an exact comparison, such a conclusion will be
stated simply. This method of questioning will provide as consistent a mode of testing across all
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variables as possible and provide an increasingly clear picture of the findings and the need for
future research.
An issue that may arise from studying this matter is the politicization surrounding the
Uyghur Muslim situation. The information retrieved must be sourced to limit the effects of such a
problem. Regarding the collection of information, the sources used will be restricted to academic
journals, books, and government publications. This is to ensure the consistency and intellectual
integrity of the thesis.
Furthermore, the concern of reliable information must be dealt with. As this situation is
being used worldwide for propaganda for multiple purposes, the data used must be as empirical as
possible and evaluated for misinformation from private and governmental sources. This issue will
be dealt with by, again, using specific academically endorsed sources, governmental reports, and
primary sources of information.
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ANALYSIS

Ideology

The Nazi Party and German Jews
Undoubtedly, it would be academically, historically, and logically inconsistent to try to
separate Hitlerism from Nazism and, subsequently, the Holocaust itself. Using the definition and
categorization process afforded by Herman & Herman (1989) regarding an ultimate decision unit,
it can be determined, as Fuhrer, Hitler would be considered a predominant leader, insensitive to
external influences, and generally self-contained (p. 363).2 Although the aforementioned article
applies its definition and categorization of decision units to foreign policy, it is the opinion of this
paper that the same process can appropriately be applied to domestic policy as well. In conjunction
with many scholars, it is the opinion of this paper that the Hitlerian ideology can be shown to be
inseparable from Nazism and the Holocaust as Hitler drove Nazi ideology and, subsequently, the
Holocaust itself. Therefore, if individuals wish to understand the ideology that drove the
Holocaust, one must understand that of Hitler.
A complication arises when trying to determine what were Hitler’s true beliefs. After all,
he was, by definition, a politician; therefore, the issue now becomes separating Hitler’s true
ideology from his rhetoric. This approach can be most effective by reviewing his ideological
stances and personal beliefs before his political career. One such opportunity is presented while

2

According to Herman & Herman (1989), a predominant leader is defined as, “A single individual [who]
has the power to make [a] choice and stifle opposition (p. 363).
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reviewing Hitler’s comments written in a letter to Adolf Gemlich on September 16, 1919. In this,
he expresses his belief that Jews are a member of a race, not a religion (Simms, 2014). Hitler goes
on to describe Jews as a “racial tuberculosis” (Rassentuberkulose der Völker) (Simms, 2014, p.
330). Although Wilhelm Marr adopted the term racial antisemitism in the late 19th century, this is
a break from historical Jewish discrimination that addressed Jews as belonging to a religious group
(Klier, 1989, p. 529). Furthermore, because of Hitler’s words in this letter, we can be certain that
Mein Kampf is an early staple of Nazi racial ideology.
Throughout history, antisemitism was primarily based on Christian anti-Judaism (Bauer,
2001). Generally, Jews are blamed for not recognizing Jesus as the Messiah and, subsequently, his
murder. According to historian George L. Moses, even German antisemitism during the 19th
century did not break the bounds of racial hatred; the Jew was not German but an outsider (Bauer,
2001). Even with Hitler’s assertion that the Jews were a diseased race, the mass murder of this
religious group was not yet in the German playbook.
This transformation from religious antisemitism to racial antisemitism effectively required
a transformation of the traditional solution to the so-called Jewish Question as well. The method
of resolving religious differences can be quite simple: offer the choice of conversion or
punishment.3 Transforming a religious group into a racial group makes this resolution untenable;
one cannot be converted to another race but can be punished for their existence.
Furthermore, with the rise of the Nazis- ironically, in part via democratic means- Hitler’s
ideology began to take root, although obtaining scant results at first. In the beginning, his virulent
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This traditional solution is a drastic simplification of historical approaches to the history of Jewish
discrimination. Throughout history, Jews have been subject to slavery, economic and political
discrimination, forced conversion, and even death (Bauer, 2001).
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antisemitism was dampened so as not to make potential supporters uneasy. Starting just two
decades before the outbreak of World War Two (WWII), Hitler wrote a twenty-point party
program for the newly named National Socialist German Worker’s Party (Nationalsozialistische
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP) (Bosmajian, 1969). He laid out some of the earliest ideas of
what this new Nazi party desired in this plan. According to Hitler’s twenty-five-point party
program, most of the problems Germans faced could be traced back to Jews; Jews could not be
citizens of Germany as they were not truly German (Bosmajian, 1969). Although this program did
state that Jews should be considered alien members of German society, that is if they didn’t have
a significant history in the nation. Unfortunately for recent migrants, they would be deported.
Furthermore, with Hitler’s time in prison and the authoring of My Struggle (Mein Kampf) in 1925,
the Nazi ideology once again became increasingly apparent as he labeled the Jew as the enemy.
During the 1932 elections, the Nazis won 37.4% of the seats in the Reichstag (German
Parliament) (Kerwin, 1932). Soon, Hitler would gain ultimate power. It is quite clear that Germany
had not embraced Nazi ideology until just before the election. In 1933, the nation had a new
chancellor, Adolf Hitler. Thus, ushering in an era of Nazi antisemitism that would soon sweep the
country.
As stated previously, Nazi antisemitism began in the shadow of economic and anticommunist propaganda, among other things. Yet, soon enough, a new pathogenic hatred that
combined Christian and pseudoscientific 19th-century antisemitism prevailed, equating the Jews
to Satan himself (Bauer, 2001). The ideology that would drive the Holocaust would continue to
fester. Yet, it also had reached a point of no return, as had Germany.
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Finally, to summarize Nazi antisemitism, Walter Zwi Bacharach (1998) describes the
fundamental qualities of the newly appointed chancellor of Germany in the book chapter
“Antisemitism and Racism in Nazi Ideology” from The Holocaust and History. Bacharach (1998)
argues it is fundamentally anti-Christian and pagan in its essence. This transformed hatred was
defined by parasitology- the Jew as a parasite, deeming Jews the core of Germanic problems and
racial hatred (Bacharach, 1998). This drove the party’s policy, running rampant in its political
convictions as well. The politicization of antisemitism was the greatest transformation of Jewish
hatred. Essentially, the Nazi Revolution was an anti-Jewish revolution.
The brief explanation and chronological summarization of Nazi ideology laid out in this
section have been written to include all generally necessary components. Therefore, removing any
portion of this paper’s explanation of Nazi ideology would deem it logically unrecognizable. Thus,
using these fundamental points, our question becomes: are there similarities between the ideology
of the Nazi Party regarding Jews and the ideology of the CCP regarding Uyghurs.

Table 1
Components of Nazi Ideology in Relation to German Jews
i.

Uses a contradictory form of the majority and a minority religion to weaken the
members of the minority, making them more vulnerable while bolstering the majority
religion, ideology, and socio-political structure of the nation itself.

ii.

Uses a group to base the nation’s problems. Broadly links this group to many issues.
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Comparative Analysis - Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party’s People’s Republic of
China Relating to the Uyghur Population of Xinjiang
With the death of Mao Zedong, Maoism has since faded as the ideological driving force in
China. According to Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova (2018), the leaders of the Chinese Communist
Party appear to base their beliefs on what can be best described as “Marxism Leninism and state
socialism” while embracing markets and entrepreneurialism (p. 325). Furthermore, the evolution
of the Xi era from the Hu era is not representative of a grand shift in ideology, but a set of different
politics used to tackle issues that have plagued China for decades. In slight contrast to the constant
revolution that defines Nazi ideology, “the onus [of CCP ideology] is on continuity, evolution, and
development in the realms of action and thought, not revolution and the dramatic abandonment of
the past” (Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018, p. 328).
According to Klimeš and Marinelli (2018), the importance of ideology as a driving factor
in the actions of the Chinese Communist Party has not decreased from the post-Mao era in the late
70s- carefully concealed but aimed at achieving sustainable one-party rule, the assertion of
discipline, and the control of the core tactical spaces. It appears that, in general, it is the common
belief that CCP ideology is driven in part by the will to make a CCP-led China a great nation. Xi
Jinping Thought has become fundamental to the evolution of China since 2012. The belief that a
Xi Jinping-led CCP would restore China to greatness could initially be seen with the updated term
limits of the State Chairman and the State Vice-Chairman while allowing President Xi to remain
in power.
In accordance with the assertion made by Klimeš and Marinelli (2018) and many other
scholars, Xi Jinping Thought is inseparable from the current ideology of the CCP and by extension,
the People’s Republic of China. Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova (2018) analyzed twelve
16

“keywords” or a “core series” of words to provide an outline the ideology of the Xi Jinping era.
Minzhu – “democratic”; “wenming” – “cultured/civilized”; “ziyou” – “freedom”; “pingdeng” –
“equality”; “fazhi” – “rule of law”; “aiguo” – “patriotism”; “jingye” – “dedication”; “chengxin”
– “trust”; “youshan” – “friendly” (pp. 332-334). By themselves, the words have little to no
recognizable connection until one analyzes how they are used. These keywords act as bonds to
Chinese nationalism and the idea of using national unity and the party that will lead China to
greatness- sacrificing human rights and other ethical concerns for the sake of the nation (Brown &
Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018). Achieving a unified China is undoubtedly a lead focal point for
President Xi in his efforts to restore a great nation. Furthermore, how one defines unity and
evaluates the price appropriate to pay to acquire such a commodity must be analyzed.
A National Security Law passed in 2015 defined “national security” as:
“A status in which the regime, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, welfare of the people,
sustainable economic and social development, and other major interests of the state are
relatively not faced with any danger and not threatened internally or externally and the
capability to maintain a sustained security status”4 (Finnegan, 2020, p. 7).
This would leave open the possibility of the CCP to use this language to target ethnic minorities,
especially Muslim minorities, as they would be considered a front to the unity of China. This can
also be seen by a Counter-Terrorism Law, “which targeted what the CCP deemed to be a terrorist
activity, with a specific focus on the Uyghur population in Xinjiang” (Finnegan, 2020, p. 7).
In general, Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party have not used Uyghurs to base
the nation’s problems entirely. Rather, they often argue that the extremist threat from the region
of western China is what drives much of their policy regarding the re-education and internment of
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Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China 2015, art 2.
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Uyghurs to help bring about a unified China. In his 2018 article, Ideology, Propaganda, and
Political Discourse in the Xi Jinping Era, Klimeš argues that national and provincial authorities
within China during President Xi’s first term introduced ethnic unity and de-extremization policies
to achieve social stability and the “modernization of the Xinjiang governance system and capacity”
(p. 418). This continuation of ideational objectives was incorporated into policy after an escalation
of violence in 2007. The ethnopolitical tensions within the Xinjiang region have troubled the
domestic security of China for decades. To this day, ideology is used to transform the worldview
and political values of Uyghurs.
In the effort to transform these values, the PRC does use propaganda to present a warped
version of Islam. However, it has not generally claimed that Islam has anything to do with blood
as the Nazis stated about German Jewry. It seems to attempt such transformations by making
security arguments and standardizing a hegemonic-Han-based way of life for what China argues
is for the benefit of Uyghurs and the country as a whole. This can be seen, in part, in the way the
government describes any unrest in the Xinjiang region as extremism. Furthermore, there are
campaigns to label Muslim religious traditions such as wearing headscarves or face coverings and
growing beards as a young man as backward, outdated, or implications of extremism.
In the early years of the Xi presidency, efforts to increase control in the Xinjiang region
have intensified efforts to alter the religion, culture, and other attributes that make up Uyghur
ethnic identity (Klimeš, 2018; Klimeš & Marinelli, 2018). After 2009, the Chinese Communist
Party continued its monetary investment policy in the Xinjiang region and combined a new
approach based on assimilation with “eugenic overtones” (Millward, 2021, p. 536). According to
Finnegan (2020), by analyzing the history of the State policies of China and the recent legislative
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initiatives over the past 20 years, the CCP has a clear aim to assimilate the Uyghur minority in
Xinjiang into the Han-majority way of life.
As a result, it does not appear that the ideology of the CCP is based on anti-Muslim
principles in the same way Nazi ideology was fundamentally borne out of antisemitism. Rather,
the CCP's ideological function, by design, produces an environment that is secular and Han-based.
Anything that challenges this hegemony is treated as a threat to unity. As such, Uyghur Muslims'
way of life and actions in Xinjiang do not meet the requirements of this ideal image of China,
regardless of extremist actions in the region.

Table 2
Core Components of Chinese Communist Party Ideology in Relation to Uyghur Muslims
i.

Strong belief in cultural hegemony and national unity.

ii.

Culturally and politically secular, leaving little room for expression outside the norm.
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Policy Implementation

Nazi Jewish policy 1933-1938
With the destruction of the Reichstag in February of 1933, the Nazis ushered in an era of
arrests, fear, and the suppression of constitutional guarantees (Leichsenring, n.d.). After a failed
attempt to secure a parliamentary majority with new elections that excluded the Communist party,
Hitler turned to other methods to ensure Nazi control (Bauer, 2001). The “Act for the Removal of
the Distress of People and Reich,” also known as the Enabling Act, was passed, removing
legislative power from the Reichstag and handing it to the Nazi-controlled government
(Leichsenring, n.d.). Furthermore, a series of legal and political actions led to the legal declaration
of Nazi hegemony- making Hitler’s party the only legal, political party in the nation (Leichsenring,
n.d.). According to Bauer (2001), after the death of Hindenburg in 1934, with the combination of
the presidency and the office of the Chancellor (Reichskanzler), a new government was created
with Hitler as supreme leader- Fürer. This cemented the ability of Hitler to swear in Nazi antiJewish policy.
According to Bessel (2004), the idea that Hitler rose to complete power because of his antiSemitic beliefs would be fundamentally untrue. Together with Bauer, these two historians make
the point that the millions of voters who supported the Nazi party did so for many reasons other
than anti-semitism. This is not to say that these additional reasons were exclusive. Certainly, the
anti-Jewish bent of Hitler and his party drew support. Yet, it should be noted that by 1933 few
Germans attempted to “stick their necks out” to resist Jewish racism (Bessel, 2004, p. 179). Jewish
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hatred was not at all new in Germany yet, the politicization of it after 1933 certainly was.
Fundamentally, it was Nazi hegemony that enabled this rapid politicization on a national scale.
A goal of the new Nazi government was the exclusion of Jews from German society. As noted
by Bauer (2001), much of the post-1933 anti-Jewish policy was seemingly in line with the general
proposals of the 1913 book, Wen Ich der Kaiser Wäre (If I were Kaiser, Berlin 1913), by Heinrich
Class (p. 108). Again, these policy proposals weren’t necessarily new; they now had the possibility
of implementation.
Between 1933 and 1935, Jews were barred from judicial service and occupations, civil service,
armed service, the press, and cultural institutions such as art, film, and theatre. Ritual slaughter
was outlawed, and Jews could no longer own German land (Bauer, 2001). There was even an
attempt to bar them from the economy writ large via a boycott of Jewish business; led by Goebbels,
Streicher, and Gauleiter, the campaign of forcing Jews out of the German economy was
established. New Jewish citizens of Germany were to be stripped of their official German status,
marriage was barred between Jews and true Germans, and it became illegal for Jews to fly the
German flag according to the so-called Nuremberg Laws (National Archives and Records
Administration, n.d.; Bauer, 2001). Even Jewish names, translated into German, were deemed
illegitimate (Bauer, 2001). Jews were stripped of political and social, and most of their economic
power.
As the war drew nearer, the outlook on the lives of German Jews became abysmal. In
conjunction with Hitler’s goal for Lebensraum (living space) across Europe for a revived Aryan
race, the Jews had to be taken care of. In 1936, Herman Göring established the Nazi Four-Year
Plan that would prepare Germany for war (Weinberg, 1988, p. 133). As such, the removal of the
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Jews had to take place during these four years. Otherwise, Hitler believed that the “Jewish Satan”
would destroy the German people- destroy or be destroyed (Bauer, 2001, p. 113). It is clear from
history that the Nazis did not achieve their goal. As such, the policies toward the Jewish people in
Germany became more extreme.
In 1938, the political, social, and economic assault on the Jews advanced. In April, hiding the
Jewish identity of businesses became illegal; these businesses had to join a registry if they were
valued at over 5,000 marks (Bauer, 2001). The restrictions on Jewish occupational options were
further limited when the law decided they were stripped of their right to provide medical treatment
to Aryans entirely (Wischnitzer, 1940). The names of all Jewish men and women were changed to
Israel and Sarah, respectively; Jewish passports were to be identified with the marking of the letter
“J” (Bauer, 2001). In addition, there later were attempts to deport Jews out of the country forcibly.
Many of these migration plans either were never implemented, did not meet their goals, or failed
entirely.
There was an escalation of anti-Jewish policy between 1933 and 1938. After Kristallnacht
(The Night of Broken Glass), the fate of the Jews deteriorated even further.

The Final Solution for Jewish Germans
The use of concentration camps in Nazi Germany started shortly after the Nazi hegemony
began in 1933. According to Goeschel and Wachsmann (2010), knowledge of the camps had
spread throughout the world prior to the discovery of their true destructive nature. While the camps
were in use, only testimonials such as that of Gerhart Seger, a former Social Democratic Reichstag
deputy who escaped the Oranienburg camp near Berlin in 1933, and other leaks offered a look into
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Nazi brutality in these establishments (Goeschel & Wachsmann, 2010). These early massdetention facilities were small in number, had a lower population, and their function was not
murder until they were transformed into sites of unbearable atrocity during wartime (Goeschel &
Wachsmann, 2010).
In conjunction with Goeschel and Wachsmann (2010), this paper asserts that there are
essentially four stages that explain the development and evolution of the concentration camps. The
early camps (1933-4); second, the formation of the Schutzstaffel (SS) camp system (1934-7); third,
the expansion of the camp system (1937-9); fourth, mass execution (1940-45). Regarding the first
stage, the camps were essentially used as weapons of domestic political terror, interning around
150,000-200,000 enemies of the state (Goeschel and Wachsmann, 2010). During the second stage,
the camp system came to fruition. No longer was the camp system an improvisation of the desires
of the Nazi party. With the SS now aiding in the establishment and control of these facilities, their
function and use became more efficient and expansive. In the third stage, the number of
concentration camps increased as the ratio of political prisoners and communists to social
undesirables began to shift towards the latter. During this period, even Jewish prisoners were
eligible for release, and most were (Goeschel and Wachsmann, 2010). The transition to the fourth
stage of camp evolution coincides with Hitler’s final solution.
First, it must be noted that by 1939, nearly half of all German Jews had left Germany (Bauer,
2001). Nearly 234,000 Jews in the pre-1938 nation were subject to the final solution (Blau, 1950).
The term, final solution was used for the first time in an order from Göring to Heydrich on July
31, 1941, that stated, “…I further commission you to submit to me promptly an overall plan
showing the preliminary organizational, substantive, and financial measures for the execution of
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the intended final solution of the Jewish question” (Bauer, 2001, p. 220). For the Jews in Germany,
they were to be deported eastward. In 1941, the year all German Jews were to be marked with the
Star of David, Hitler stated on October 6th that “all Jews have to be removed from the protectorate,
not only to the General Government but straight on to the east. …Together with the Jews of the
Protectorate, all the Jews of Vienna and Berlin must disappear” (Browning, 1994, p. 477). Hedrick
also announced, “the Fürer wishes that by the end of the year as many Jews as possible are removed
from the German sphere” (Browning, 1994, p. 477). With this, on October 18, 1941, Hitler gave
the order to deport all Jews to the east and to ban Jewish emigration from the Third Reich
(Browning, 1994, p. 478). Heydrich continued, “In the course of the final solution, the Jews should
be brought under appropriate direction in a suitable manner to the east for labor utilization” (Bauer,
2001, pp. 224-225). He would further explain that those who could not work would succumb to
the fate of natural selection, i.e., annihilation (Bauer, 2001).
Beyond the pre-1938 borders of Germany, the rest of Europe was not made safe for the creation
of more living room for a new Aryan future that Hitler hoped for. With the end of the Nazi reign
of terror in 1945, only about 19,000 of the original 540,000 German Jews remained in Germany
itself, a 96.4% decrease (Blau, 1950). After 1939, 131,500 of the remaining Jews were deported,
61,500 emigrated, and 21,646 deceased- a much lower death rate than much of Europe, especially
Poland (Blau, 1950). Fundamentally, Hitler and his party had achieved their goal, in part, to
extinguish any and all Jewish presence in Germany.
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Table 3
Core Components of Nazi Policy in Relation to German Jews
i.

First used exclusion from economy, society, and forced relocation; last resort method
was extermination.

ii.

Attempts to de-nationalize the group.

iii.

Attempts to dehumanize the group.

Comparative Analysis – Policy Implementations of the People’s Republic of China Relating to
the Uyghur Population of Xinjiang
Many refer to China, with its Han ethnic majority, as a “culturally homogenous” nationstate with little tolerance for anti-secularism and any thought outside the PRC Han-Chinese norm
(Clarke, 2013, p. 110). With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on October 1st,
1949, and the assertion that Mao Zedong’s China-controlled Xinjiang, the new country was
seemingly on a rough path- Han secularism versus Islam and separatism.
To the extent that the PRC has de-nationalized Uyghurs, this method of problem-solving
used by the Nazis over 75 years ago is essentially nonexistent. In fact, the Chinese government has
actively attempted to suppress separatist movements and re-educate Uyghurs to become more
Chinese and less extremist. Historically, some of the most violent and sincere separatist initiatives
have taken place within Xinjiang (Lai, 2002). These separatist motives are driven, in part, by a
“complex mix of history, ethnicity, and religion - fueled by poverty, unemployment, social
disparities, and political grievances” (Davis, 2008, p. 15). The Chinese government has responded
to these with varying severity. From police and military intervention to economic development,
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the Chinese government has stated its goal is to “undermine Uyghur calls for independence” and
solve the problems driving this threat to Chinese unity (Davis, 2008, p. 17).
Compared to the Jews of Germany during the Holocaust, there was an effort on the part of
the PRC to increase the economic situation of the Xinjiang region. However, the benefit reaped by
the Uyghur population was disproportionately lower than that of the Han population in the same
areas. With the establishment of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, the nation
attempted to develop loosely populated portions of the region in 1954. Slightly less than a year
later, China formalized the existence of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, headed by
Seypiden Aziz (a Uyghur Muslim himself), yet, Chinese general Wang Enmao (replacing Wang
Zhen) indeed controlled the territory as the First Secretary of the CCP in Xinjiang and commander
of the Xinjiang Military Region (Millward, 2021). Throughout the history of the People’s Republic
of China, as mentioned previously, the government has consistently denounced the idea that
Xinjiang is anything but a part of China. Yet, the development of this region has wavered for
decades- severely lagging that of coastal areas.
Migration has been a popular method for increased modernization for nearly two centuries.
According to Millward (2021), the Qing dynasty allowed Han settlement in the region starting in
1831; in 1947, Han Chinese individuals within Xinjiang constituted roughly 5% of the population
compared to the 40.6% - 43.0% in 2000- depending on the inclusion of “non-registered migrants”
(pp. 432-434). Comparatively, the Uyghur population in 2000 was about 8.35 million, and the Han
population was approximately 7.49 million (Millward, 2021). Nicholas Becquelin has argued that
his policy of accelerated migration was intended to increase security and dilute ethnic dissent and
separatist tensions (Millward, 2021). While it was the goal to advance the development of this
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region via migration, which was relatively successful in building new cities and transforming
farming landscapes, these migration programs disproportionately favored the Han migrantsfurther increasing tensions between the ethnic minorities of the area.
On January 1st, 2000, the People’s Republic of China sought to deal with the development
issues and disproportionate growth of the country's interior more directly with the announcement
of the Great Development of the West program.

In Lai’s 2002 article, China's Western

Development Program: Its Rationale, Implementation, and Prospects, the author describes issues
that may complicate the progression or success of the program. One such argument seemingly
echos the conclusion brought by Nicholas Becqueline in that, while the program is partially
intended to secure national security and unity, the “Han population tends to receive better
education and possesses higher skills” (Lai, 2002, p. 460). Written before many of the tensions
increased due to this program, Lai (2002) predicted that this program would increase competition
between Han and ethnic minorities.
September 11, 2001, became a crucial year, not only for the American “War on Terror” but
also for the “crack down” on “separatism, extremism, and terrorism” in Xinjiang (Davis, 2008, pp.
17-18). In a speech on June 17, 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao stated, “We have to fight against
the three evils of separatism, extremism, and terrorism” (Davis, 2008, p. 18). This implies that the
Chinese government would act swiftly and sincerely against any threat in these forms.
Han-Uyghur violence would mark 2009 as an escalatory period between the two ethnic
groups. Several hundred Uyghur workers who were relocated under a special program that
transferred individuals from Xinjiang to factories in eastern China found themselves under attack
from Han workers from the same factory in which they worked together (Ryono & Galway, 2014).
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During the night of June 26th, Han individuals attacked the migrant workers in and around their
dorms profusely on the false accusation that Uyghurs had raped a Han woman at the factory. Later,
in July of that year, the riots in Urumqi marked another escalation. A spiraling of events after a
primarily peaceful Uyghur-led protest, in response to the incident in Guangdong, occurred in
Urumqi People’s Square leading to the violent suppression of the demonstration. Uyghur rioting
flared up nearby, beating Han individuals and burning property. Through early July, violent clashes
sprung up back and forth between both ethnic groups. State media reported that Uyghurs were
primarily responsible for the damage. The PRC would further collective treatment and punishment
against the Uyghur populations of Xinjiang.
In conjunction with the Lhasa riots of 2008, the events in 2009 transformed Beijing’s
approach to Xinjiang development. According to Millward (2021), the CCP has made assimilation
a staple of its approach to modernization in the region. In 2010, the CCP expanded the Counterpart
Assistance for Xinjiang program, further directing economic investment into the Xinjiang region.
Yet, once again, favoring Han Chinese individuals and communities over Uyghurs. Furthermore,
this program and other modernization efforts have led to the destruction of historical Uyghur
architecture, such as the demolition of 85% of the religious city of Kashgar, which forced much of
its population into high-rise buildings in the name of earthquake protection.
Furthermore, Sufi shrines, graveyards, and mosques such as Keriya Heytgah (Aitika), the
largest mosque in the region (constructed in 1200), was destroyed between late 2017 and early
2018. Similarly, the Grand Mosque in Kargilik (over 400 years old) was destroyed in late 2018.
Over 100 mosques had been completely torn down during the same period or had substantial
restructuring. Although many mosques had been repaired or rebuilt- this was widely publicized in
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the state media. “Satellite images from 2020 showed barren dirt where these structures had stood
a few months or years earlier” (Millward, 2021, p. 545).
Rather than institute a similar exclusionary (Jewish) policy that dominated the Nazi era,
the newest addition of the developmental attempts on behalf of the PRC in the Xinjiang region,
the government has attempted to assimilate Uyghurs into the Han norm. The Xinjiang region has
been subject to many investments in teaching traditional Chinese culture. The investment approach
uses terminology such as national language (gouyu) to replace the Han language (Hanyu),
teaching Confucianism and classic Chinese literature in a region where the traditional culture is
strong and seen as more significant than Han culture (Millward, 2021). Mandarin-only or
Mandarin-based education has become a staple of investments in the region, slowly excluding
Uyghur teachers unable to provide Mandarin instruction and slowly easing the language into many
areas. Furthermore, starting in 2011, an effort to discourage women from wearing head and face
coverings began (Project Beauty). A common practice was now being branded as backward and
outdated. Other campaigns to discourage fasting during Ramadan and other religious stables such
as beards on young men grew in intensity.
These early efforts to assimilate the non-Han population seemingly stalled or fell behind.
Violent instances between citizens and police increased from 2013 to 2015 (Roberts, 2018).
Regardless of the situation or cause of the violence, the PRC has consistently labeled any incidents
of unrest in the region as terrorism. Although, there were several attacks in 2013 and 2014
involving Uyghurs that led to the 656-715 deaths (Roberts, 2018). This has led to an intensification
of development and anti-extremist policies.
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In resemblance to the verbiage used by the United States and its “War on Terror”, May of
2014 was marked by an intensification of “Strike Hard” (Clarke, 2013; Trevaskes, 2016). Under
the control of President Xi Jinping, the CCP has cracked down on what they consider “challenges
to national security” internally (Cai, 2017, p. 80). With the passage of the new National Security
Law of 2015, the CCP has begun, at least legislatively, focusing on these threats and deextremification, “including activities of the Uyghur minority population” (Finnegan, 2020, p. 7).
According to the CCP, the target of this legislation was the East Turkestan Islamic Movement
(ETIM) (Finnegan, 2020).
Mass surveillance and data collection programs that store information such as banking,
social media, biometric information (face scans and other genetic or physical identifiers) fed into
the Integrated Joint Military Operations Platform (IJOP), which takes advantage of facialrecognition video surveillance to track individuals (Leibold, 2020). According to the Chinese
government, this program helps identify extremism as it takes place or even before it occurs. Such
markers of extremism include owning illegal religious books, posters, maps, etc., instructing
religion, keeping beards, wearing full-face coverings, and much more. In part, the IJOP system, in
accordance with a system that enables Han-Chinese to live among Uyghur communities and point
out any suspicious activity to authorities, led to additional legal action against individuals
suspected of extremism.
Since the end of 2016, the PRC has detained an estimated one in eleven Uyghurs in the
Xinjiang region since Chen Quanguo, the new Xinjiang Party Secretary as of August 2016,
initiated a vast expansion of “concentrated educational transformation” (Roberts, 2020; Matacic,
2019). Among the first detained were “the cultural, commercial and political elites of Uyghur
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society, including hundreds of professors, editors, and publishers who had produced, under stat
auspices, the language and literature textbooks later criticized as separatist” (Millward, 2021, p.
559).
“To manage such numbers, Xinjiang administrative units and Bingtuan settlements called
for private corporate bides to construct and outfit a network of large internment camps
surrounded by high walls, barbed wire, and watchtowers, secured inside with locked cells,
locked corridors, and ubiquitous video surveillance, and controlled by guards armed with
stun guns, tasers, tear gas, and spiked clubs-all detailed in tenders openly published online
by Xinjiang local administrative units” (Millward, 2021, p. 560).
A comparison can be made between the concentration camps and migration policies during
the Holocaust and those within China. As stated previously in this thesis, when the remaining Jews
of Germany had clearly not left the country, they were either forcefully deported to extermination
camps outside pre-1938 German borders or exterminated in camps within these borders. Uyghurs
within Xinjiang detained in concentration camps (not currently known to be extermination camps)
are still within the region. Beyond the re-education camps, though, many Uyghurs are sent to
forced labor facilities in other parts of the country, where they are subject to educational training.
There is a seemingly unlimited amount of conflicting information between personal
accounts, Western intelligence sources, and the official statements from the PRC. Personal
accounts describe places of forced re-education paired with physical and psychological torture.
The official word from the Chinese government denies any claims of torture. The general trend
asserts that these institutions are purely educational, providing individuals with job training and
uprooting extremist thought. Yet, it must be noted that the PRC initially denied the existence of
such concentration camps and, upon United Nations investigatory challenge, admitted to their
existence but assured the world these camps were re-education camps focused on tackling
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extremism in the region. Once again, it pays to look at the words of Chinese organizations
themselves.
Although the current concentration camps within the Xinjiang region are not known to be
mass-extermination camps, many policies have seemingly led to a significant stall in population
growth. Millward (2021) argues that due to the harsh repercussions of many policies, such as the
infamous One-Child Policy, the Uyghur population growth rate fell by 84% between 2015 and
2018. Another striking statistic comes from intrauterine device (IUD) implants specifically which
aid in pregnancy prevention. In China during 2014, 2.5% of IUDs implanted were done in Xinjiang
compared to an incredible 80% in 2018. Even sterilizations are not consistent when comparing
Xinjiang to the rest of the country. While the rate of sterilizations within the country was 33 per
100,000, sterilizations within Xinjiang increased and was tallied at 243 per 100,000 in 2018.
According to Zenz (2021), not a single individual was recorded as born outside the bounds of
government planning. 88% of women of “childbearing age” in Kizilsu (a Chinese autonomous
prefecture) had “adopted long term effective birth measures” (p. 4). It has been concluded by
scholars such as Zenz (2021) that there is a clear “intent to reduce ethnic minority population
growth in order to increase the proportionate Han population in southern Xinjiang” (p. 17). He
further backs this assertion by pointing directly to the ideology and language used by Chinese
academics and officials and many of the policies themselves.
Regarding any de-humanization of Uyghurs like that of the Jews in Germany, in general,
this has not been attempted to any extent other than to describe the population as vulnerable to the
disease of extremism. Hence their supposed need for re-education. Uyghurs in the region have not
been described writ-large and in intentional propaganda campaigns as non-human or at the same
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level as Satan. Zenz (2021) states that non-Han Chinese individuals are often referred to as
“problems” that threaten an otherwise “healthy” society (p. 17). Millward (2021) provides a quote
from the Xinjiang Communist Youth League:
“If we do not eradicate religious extremism at its roots, the violent terrorist incidents will
grow and spread all over like an incurable malignant tumor. Although many people who
have been indoctrinated with extremist ideology have not committed any crimes, they are
already infected by the disease. There is always a risk that the illness will manifest itself at
any moment, which would cause serious harm to the public. That is why they must be
admitted to a re-education hospital in time to treat and cleanse the virus from their brain
and restore their normal mind. We must be clear that going into a re-education hospital for
treatment is not a way of forcibly arresting people and locking them up for punishment, it
is an act that is part of a comprehensive rescue mission to save them” (pp. 561-562).
Table 4
Core Components of Chinese Communist Party Policy in Relation to Uyghur Muslims
i.

Attempted re-education and financial investment efforts to make individuals and communities
fit the Han-Chinese norm.

ii.

Direct attempts to de-humanize individuals through their treatment and portrayal in
propaganda.

iii.

Forced relocation, labor, education, sterilization leading to severe population reduction in the
present and among future projections
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CONCLUSION

To conclude, the treatment of Uyghur Muslims on the part of the People’s Republic of
China and the treatment of Jews in Germany on the part of the Nazis are, individually, infinitely
complex. This thesis has sought to provide a so-called lay-of-the-land regarding the extent to which
two broad variables within each case are similar or dissimilar. This paper has compared the
ideologies of the People’s Republic of China to Nazi Germany and the policies of each respective
party regarding an individual ethnic minority within them.
Regarding ideology, it was determined that there are two essential components to Nazi
ideology that drove the Holocaust. First, Germany used a contradictory form of Judaism to weaken
the members of the religion and bolster the Nazi ideology itself. Second, Germany used Jews to
blame much of the nation’s problems. The extent to which the ideology of the ruling Chinese
Communist Party resembles the core components of Nazi ideology is minimal. While China has
seemingly over-ascribed the term extremism and attempted to label many parts of Muslim culture
as outdated or regressive, it has not reached the levels of Nazi-antisemitism propaganda. In order
to do so, it would most likely have to openly and actively renounce every aspect of Islam as evil
and a threat to society, which it currently has not done in the mainstream. The Asian nation has
also not ascribed blame to Uyghurs for much of the country’s issues. Besides a potential threat to
loosely defined unity, and actual threat of extremism, China would need to extend blame for any
economic drawbacks or pitfalls; a wrongful mixing of blood; or treat Islam as a race of subhuman,
Satan-like cancer within Chinese society, preventing the nation reaching its full potential.
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Concerning the antisemitic policies of Nazi Germany, three core components were derived:
Jews were excluded from the economy and society, subjected to forced relocation, and
exterminated as a last resort; there was a sincere attempt to de-nationalize the group; there was a
sincere attempt to dehumanize the group. Regarding the first component, Uyghurs have not been
excluded from the economy. Although severely flawed, there have been attempts to bring the
Xinjiang region up to date with the coastal regions of the nation. Uyghurs have not been excluded
from the society to the same extent. There are attempts to bring non-Han individuals into the
mainstream of Chinese society via ethical and non-ethical means, but it cannot be said that the
response of the CCP has been to outright exclude the Uyghur population. Some Uyghurs have been
relocated to forced labor camps outside the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to eastern
portions of China or re-education concentration camps within the region, making this case only
slightly like the relocation efforts and concentration camps of the Nazis. In order to make the case
of the Uyghurs identical to that of the Holocaust, the Chinese government would need first to
attempt to encourage emigration while excluding Uyghurs from society and the economy over
time; then force emigration; and when emigration is no longer an option, exterminate the remaining
individuals. While the situation in Xinjiang and the forced labor facilities across China are of grave
concern, they are not nearly identical to those of the Holocaust- according to our current knowledge.
They are perhaps more similar to the early concentration camps within Germany that interned
political prisoners and the Jewish elite. At this time, prisoners in Nazi camps were eligible for
release, like Uyghurs- although many are released from Xinjiang into forced labor across China.
The People’s Republic of China has not attempted to de-nationalize the Uyghur population
to the same extent that Jews were stripped of their ability to be truly German. While Uyghurs have
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been subject to treatment that would suggest the PRC considers them outside the Han-Chinese
norm and thus require assimilation, the Chinese government would, at a minimum, need to pass
laws similar to that of the Nuremberg Laws, which stripped Jews of their citizenship, prevented
marriages with true Germans and disallowed Jews to fly the German flag.
Furthermore, there has been some level of dehumanization on the part of the PRC towards
Uyghurs in Xinjian, yet it has not reached the levels of 1930s and 40s Germany. The Chinese
dehumanization of Uyghurs can be seen in many of their statements and beliefs that they are the
other, weeds, or problems, and a group that needs saving from the disease of extremism.
Nevertheless, the treatment of this ethnic minority would need to evolve into something of a
propaganda campaign to paint them as literal non-humans or a separate race entirely. Compared to
Nazi propaganda and intentions, as far as we know, the Chinese government has not planned to
exterminate the Uyghur Race and display their remains in Museums. However, it must be noted
that there seems to be significant evidence pointing to an attempt to reduce the ethnic minority
population in southern Xinjiang. This begs the necessity for future research into cultural and ethnogenocide.
While it has been concluded that many aspects of the two cases studied here are highly
dissimilar, it has not been concluded that there are no atrocities or that the term genocide should
not be attributed to the treatment of the Muslim minority in Xinjiang. What has been concluded,
the Holocaust still stands unique. Considering the analysis of this paper, the Nazi Genocide is still
the only case in history in which a government attempted to eliminate an entire ethnic minority
from the face of the Earth. This paper's research, discussion, or conclusion is by no means an
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exoneration of the ideology or policies of the People’s Republic of China; that much must be
crystal clear. This paper strongly recommends that future research be conducted on this topic.
Regarding the limitations of this paper, there have been few historical comparisons
of the Uyghur situation. This paper has relied heavily on content pertaining to each case, isolated
from another. The time-sensitive nature of this project creates the potential for missing information
that may be key to further analyzing the questions within the thesis. With the mass of material
available and produced, future research must continue to re-examine this comparative analysis and
the facts therein.
This research was further complicated by using specific sources while excluding others.
Much of the available material relevant to this study is biased in some manner. Therefore, choosing
appropriate sources to conduct this analysis was particularly extensive. With such a controversial
topic, this thesis was forced to exclude many partisan sources and heavily research the authors of
the sources themselves as evidence provided by certain sources does not always reflect reality.
Regarding the future exploration of this topic, many questions arise. Is the response of the
People’s Republic of China proportional to the actual level of extremism? If not, to what extent, if
any, has the Chinese government overstepped? These questions could be answered via a forensic
analysis of the available data from public sources. Information analyzed could include CCP
government documents, propaganda, international organization reporting (United Nations), or
intelligence data gathered by reliable government sources. To determine the appropriateness of the
response on the part of the CPP regarding Uyghur extremism, one should further analyze the
existence of propaganda used to support national or regional policies. Furthermore, comparing the
proportionality of the accusations and reasoning behind the CCP’s policies to its actual response
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could be further analyzed via comparative case analysis to determine the norms regarding
proportional policy.
Another question: Is the international response to the situation proportional to the perceived
severity of the situation? What is the level of similarity or proportionality of the international
response to the Holocaust to the global response to the situation in Xinjiang? Analyzing these
questions could potentially reveal the repetition of past mistakes. As stated in the thesis, history
often rhymes. So, indeed our mistakes can too. Therefore, research must be conducted to determine
whether there is enough or disproportionally more information regarding the Uyghur Crisis to
justify the current response of the international community. Such a question could be analyzed
similarly to the research in this piece. Conducting a comparative analysis of the proportionality of
the response to accusations and cases of potential human rights abuses would provide a decent
path for clarification.
Furthermore, this thesis's suggestion is to conduct research that is not constrained by
anything but the expectation of the quality of content. If the academic and professional community
is to put meaning to the phrase never again, it must answer these questions and many more.
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